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This paper updates and extends the work of Barro (2000). International data confirm the 
presence of the Kuznets curve—an inverse-U shape relationship between income inequality 
and per capita GDP—that is relatively stable from the 1960s into the 2000s. The direct effect of 
international openness on income inequality is also found to be positive. On the other hand, a 
cross-country-growth equation shows a negative effect of income inequality on economic 
growth, holding fixed a familiar set of other explanatory variables. This effect diminishes as per 
capita GDP rises and may be positive for the richest countries. 
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My previous study (Barro 2000) used panel data for many countries from 1960 to analyze the 
two-way interplay between income inequality and economic performance. The effect of real per 
capita gross domestic product (GDP) on inequality involved the well-known inverse-U-shaped 
relation known as the Kuznets curve. Starting from a low value, an increase in per capita GDP 
tended to raise inequality. But this relation eventually flattened out at sufficiently high per capita 
GDP, and further increases tended to reduce inequality. 
 
The earlier study summarized theories, starting with Kuznets’ analysis, for the presence of the 
Kuznets curve. The main idea is that economic development-including shifts from agriculture to 
industry and services and the adoption of new technologies-initially benefits mainly a minority of 
the population. As the new methods of production become widespread, the benefits from 
economic development are shared more evenly, and higher per capita GDP tends to reduce 
inequality. 
 
At an empirical level, my previous results confirmed the presence of the Kuznets curve across 
countries and over time. However, the curve did not explain a large fraction of the observed 
variation in income inequality. 
 
The second direction of effect involved the impact of income inequality on rates of economic 
growth. My discussion summarized existing economic theories of this relation, with a focus on 
four major features: credit-market imperfections, political economy, social unrest, and saving 
rates. These theories did not produce clear empirical predictions for the overall effect of income 
inequality on economic growth. I studied the relation, empirically employing a cross-country 
regression framework. The regressions included as explanatory variables the initial levels of per 
capita GDP, health, and school attainment, along with several other variables. One conclusion 
was that the overall effect of income inequality on economic growth was weak and, often, 
statistically insignificantly different from zero. However, there was an indication that inequality 
was bad for growth in poor countries and good for growth in rich countries. These results could 
be interpreted from the perspective of some of the underlying theoretical models. In particular, 
the differing effects for poor and rich could reflect the greater impact of credit market restraints 
in poor countries. 
 
The present analysis updates the previous cross-country research. In particular, I consider 
whether the relationships between income inequality and economic performance have changed 
along with developments that can be characterized as globalization. Particularly interesting here 
is whether international trade has a regular relationship with income inequality and whether this 
relationship has shifted over time. I also assess whether the Kuznets curve-relating inequality to 
the evolution of per capita GDP-has shifted in recent years. 
 
 
II.   Income-Inequality Data 
 
Fortunately, there is now more and better international information on income inequality 
compared to the data available for my previous study—which relied on the World Bank’s 
Deininger and Squire (1996) data set. The present work uses as its principal source the World 
Income Inequality Database from May 2007 compiled by the United Nations (UN). This data 
base builds on the Deininger-Squire compilation to include recent observations and to 
supplement the earlier data. My analysis uses only the UN data categorized as quality grades 
1–3; that is, I exclude grade 4, labeled as memorandum items, which are viewed as unreliable. I  
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add in high-quality Deininger-Squire (World Bank) data for country/year observations not 
covered by the UN. 
 
Table 1 shows the evolution of income inequality for world averages from the 1960s to the 
2000s. The table considers three standard measures of income inequality: the Gini coefficient; 
the share of income going to the lowest quintile of the income distribution and; the share going 
to the highest quintile. The Gini coefficient can be viewed as an average of deviations of quintile 
shares from 0.2, the value that holds under full equality. In the formula for the Gini coefficient, 
positive weights apply to upper-income shares and negative weights to lower-income shares.
1
 
Thus, a higher Gini (measured on a zero-to one scale) signifies more income inequality. 
 
The (equally weighted) world average for the Gini coefficient stays close to 0.4, declining from 
0.43 in the 1960s to 0.39 in the 2000s. The lowest-quintile income shares tell a similar story. 
The average share goes from 5.6% in the 1960s to 6.1% in the 2000s. For the upper-quintile 
share, the world average shows little trend, varying between 46% and 49%. 
 
Table 2 shows means and standard deviations for some of the variables used in the subsequent 
analysis. The samples used in the table are dictated by the availability of income-inequality data 
(and correspond specifically to the regression system used in Table 3). The number of country 
observations goes from 54 in the 1960s to 77 in the 1970s, 90 in the 1980s, 120 in the 1990s, 
and 92 in the 2000s (in which information is available through 2004). 
 
The income-inequality data derive from surveys or other information sources that differ by 
concept. Two important distinctions are whether the underlying economic definition corresponds 
to income or consumer spending, and on whether the income figures are gross or net of taxes. 
Empirically, patterns of inequality differ particularly as to whether the data cover gross income, 
on the one hand, versus net income or expenditure, on the other Table 2 shows that the 
breakdown by type varied over time—37% of the observations applied to net income or 
spending in the 1960s, compared with 67% in the 2000s. Another distinction is whether the 
underlying economic unit is an individual versus a household or family. In the 1960s, 37% of the 
observations were for individuals, compared with 83% in the 2000s. 
 
Table 2 also shows statistics for variables used in the subsequent regressions. These variables 
are dummies for sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, a dummy for being a former colony, 
and an international-openness variable (the ratio to GDP of exports plus imports, filtered for the 
usual effect on trade from country size). 
 
 
III.   Estimated Kuznets Curves 
 
Table 3 shows results for regression systems intended to estimate Kuznets curves. The 
dependent variables are measures of income inequality—the first three columns have Gini 
coefficients, the next has the lowest quintile share, and the last has the highest quintile share. 
The equations are for five time periods; the dependent variable for the first period is around 
1965, and so on for the other periods. 
 
                                                 
1  If Qi is the income share for quintile i, and if we assume that each agent within each quintile has the same income, the Gini 
coefficient can be expressed as GINI = 0.4·[2·(Q5-0.2) + (Q4-0.2) – (Q2-0.2) – 2·(Q1-0.2)]. 
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The results in columns 1 and 2 show the usual Kuznets relationship—a significantly positive 
effect on the Gini coefficient from the log of per capita GDP and a significantly negative effect 
from the square of the log of per capita GDP. In these systems, per capita GDP applies in 1960 
for the first period, and so on for the other periods. Column 1 includes as additional regressors 
only the two definitional variables mentioned before. The dummy for net income or expenditure 
has significantly negative coefficients. That is, gross income shows significantly more measured 
inequality—because taxes tend to be equalizing (and, perhaps, because consumption is 
smoother than income). The dummy for individual observations is also negative and sometimes 
statistically significant. That is, households show somewhat more inequality than persons. 
 
Column 3 of Table 3 adds in some regressors that turn out to have considerable explanatory 
power for income inequality. The dummies for sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America are 
significantly positive and large in size. That is, these regions exhibit substantially more income 
inequality than other places, for given per capita GDP. The dummy for a former colony is also 
significantly positive. 
 
The results in Table 3, column 2 show that the openness variable has a significantly positive 
coefficient, though the effect is not large in magnitude. A one-standard-deviation increase in the 
openness variable (by 0.4; see Table 2) tends to raise the Gini coefficient by about 0.01, 
compared to the sample standard deviation of the Gini coefficient of around 0.10 (see Table 2).
2
 
Thus, there is evidence that, for given per capita GDP, more trade creates more income 
inequality. However, this result does not consider that trade also affects economic growth, as 
explored later, and thereby affects levels of per capita GDP. The effects on per capita GDP 
have to be considered to estimate the full impact of trade on income inequality. Moreover, if 
trade raises per capita GDP (as the later evidence indicates) trade can increase inequality while 
simultaneously lowering poverty (defined as the number of persons below a given level of real 
income). 
 
Figure 1 uses the results from Table 3, column 2 to depict the partial relation between the Gini 
coefficient and the log of per capita GDP. The inverted-U relation follows from the estimated 
pattern of coefficients—positive on the log of per capita GDP and negative on its square. The 
derivative of the Gini coefficient with respect to the log of per capita GDP is given from the 
estimated coefficients as 0.292 - 0.0364*log(GDP), where GDP is now a shorthand for real per 
capita GDP. Therefore, the effect is positive for log(GDP) less than 8.02—or per capita GDP 
below $3,050 (in 2000 US dollars)—and then becomes positive. Note from Table 2 that this 
break point is well below the sample mean for log(GDP) of around 8.5. The majority of 
observations are in the range where higher per capita GDP leads to lower income inequality. 
 
The estimates in Table 3 include separate intercepts for each time period. For the specification 
in column 2, the intercepts—expressed relative to that for the 1960s—are -0.011 (s.e. = 0.012) 
for the 1970s, -0.018 (0.013) for the 1980s, 0.012 (0.014) for the 1990s, and 0.006 (0.014) for 
the 2000s. A test that these values are jointly equal to zero (so that a single intercept applies 
from the 1960s to the 2000s) has a p-value of 0.011. Therefore, a common intercept is rejected 
at conventional significance levels. However, the results do not show quantitatively important 
variations in the intercept over time. Therefore, there is no indication that income inequality has 
                                                 
2  The filtering for country population and area in the construction of the openness variable eliminates the part of trade that arises 
naturally in response to variations in country size. The results support the idea that openness matters for inequality relative to this 
natural openness, rather than in an absolute sense. If the openness ratio (exports plus imports relative to GDP) is also entered 
into the regression system, the coefficient on this ratio is -0.034 (s.e. = 0.022), which differs insignificantly from zero. The 
coefficient of the openness variable remains significantly positive: 0.064 (0.028).  
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been changing much, for given values of per capita GDP, international openness, and the other 
explanatory variables. 
 
We can also consider whether the Kuznets coefficients—on log(GDP) and its square—have 
been varying over time. In this case, the hypothesis of equal coefficients for the five time periods 
has a p-value of 0.12. Therefore, stable coefficients would be accepted at conventional 
significance levels. However, the point estimates for the 2000s are notably high; 0.49 (s.e. = 
0.09) on log(GDP) and -0.029 (0.005) on its square, compared to the overall values of 0.29 
(0.06) and -0.018 (0.003) in Table 3, column 2. Therefore, there is an indication that Kuznets 
effects are particularly important in recent years. 
 
We can similarly assess the stability of the effect of the international-openness variable on 
income inequality. In this case, the hypothesis of equal coefficients for the five periods has a p-
value of 0.96. Hence, the data clearly accord with stability in this effect. That is, there is no 
indication that income inequality has become more sensitive over time to the extent of 
international trade. 
 
Even with a stable coefficient on the international-openness variable, the rising trade share from 
the 1960s to the 2000s would have contributed, on its own, to rising income inequality. Table 2 
shows that the mean of the openness ratio rose from 0.47 in the 1960s to 0.87 in the 2000s. 
This sharp expansion of trade generated an increase in the mean of the openness variable 
(which includes adjustments for country size) from 0.02 in the 1960s to 0.39 in the 2000s. With 
the coefficient of 0.026 on the openness variable in the Gini-coefficient system (Table 3, column 
2), this rise in trade implies an increase in the estimated average Gini coefficient by about 0.01 
(compared to the sample mean of around 0.40 and standard deviation of 0.10 in Table 2). 
 
This small predicted effect of rising trade on income inequality is not the full story. If enhanced 
trade leads to faster economic growth, as discussed later, the trade expansion would lead, over 
time, to higher average levels of per capita GDP. Because the majority of countries are in the 
range of the Kuznets curve where higher per capita GDP lowers income inequality, this effect 
would tend to reduce the average Gini coefficient. Hence, an expansion of world trade need not 
generate greater world income inequality. This result is consistent with the observation from 
Table 2 that the sample average of the Gini coefficients has fallen somewhat from the 1960s to 
the 2000s. 
 
The estimates discussed thus far used intercepts that varied over time but did not introduce 
separate intercepts for each country (although the error terms in the regressions were allowed 
to be correlated over time within country). Table 3, column 3 introduces country fixed effects; 
that is, a separate intercept for each country. This specification necessarily drops any 
explanatory variables that remain constant over time within a country—these variables from 
column 2 are the dummies for sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America and the dummy for former 
colony. 
 
The coefficient estimates in column 3 show the usual Kuznets pattern: significantly positive for 
the log of per capita GDP and significantly negative for its square. A difference compared with 
columns 1 and 2 is that the magnitudes of the fixed-effects coefficients are smaller. This 
difference likely arises because the fixed-effects estimates isolate short-term variation over time 
within countries, whereas the estimates without fixed effects tend to pick up longer-run 
responses. In the fixed-effects case, the estimated breakpoint between positive and negative 
marginal effects of log(GDP) on the Gini coefficient occurs at 7.56, compared to the higher 
value of 8.02 from the specification in Table 3, column 2. According to the fixed-effects results,  
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the marginal impact of higher per capita GDP on the Gini coefficient is negative for per capita 
GDP greater than $1,920 (In 2000 US dollars). Hence, even a greater majority of observations 
are in the range in which more prosperity means less income inequality. 
 
Columns 4 and 5 of Table 3 show estimated Kuznets curves when inequality is gauged by the 
share of income accruing to either the lowest or highest quintile of the income distribution. 
These results are similar to those from before in that, initially, higher per capita GDP generates 
more inequality in the sense of a higher Gini coefficient (column 2), a lower income share for the 
lowest quintile (column 4), and a higher income share for the highest quintile (column 5). 
Subsequently, all of these effects reverse sign. 
 
 
IV.   Inequality as a Determinant of Economic Growth 
 
Table 4 uses cross-country growth regressions to assess the effects of income inequality on 
economic growth. The analysis considers determinants of growth rates of per capita GDP over 
four periods: 1965–75, 1975–85, 1985–95, and, depending on the availability of recent GDP 
data, from 1995 to 2003 or 2004. The results in column 1 omit consideration of income 
inequality, whereas those in columns 2 and 3 include Gini coefficients as measures of income 
inequality. The sample sizes correspond to the availability of data on Gini coefficients and are, 
therefore, the same for all three cases. 
 
The right-hand sides of the regressions comprise explanatory variables that are familiar from the 
conditional-convergence framework.
3
  The results in Table 4, column 1 show the usual 
significantly negative effect from the initial log of per capita GDP. Thus, holding fixed the other 
explanatory variables, countries tend to grow faster if they start poorer. Initial health (proxied by 
life expectancy at age one) has a significantly positive effect, and initial upper-level school 
attainment of males has a positive but statistically insignificant effect. As already mentioned, the 
openness variable has a significantly positive effect on growth rates. Changes in the terms of 
trade have a positive but statistically insignificant effect. The fertility rate has a significantly 
negative effect, and the investment ratio has a positive but statistically insignificant effect. 
 
Column 2 of Table 4 adds to the regressions of the Gini coefficient. This variable applies around 
1965 to the growth equation for 1965–75, and so on for the other periods. The estimated 
coefficient, -0.036 (s.e. = 0.014), is significantly negative. This result contrasts with my earlier 
findings in Barro (2000), in which the income-inequality variable had an insignificant effect in this 
type of regression system. The present estimated coefficient of -0.036 implies that a one-
standard-deviation increase in the Gini coefficient reduces the growth rate on impact by about 
0.4% per year. 
 
Column 3 of Table 4 adds an interaction term between the Gini coefficient and the log of per 
capita GDP. The Gini variable is still significantly negative. The significantly positive coefficient 
on the interaction term indicates that the impact of inequality on growth is most negative for the 
poorest countries. This effect attenuates as per capita GDP rises. Eventually—at a per capita 
GDP of $11,900 (in 2000 US dollars)—the estimated effect of inequality on growth becomes 
positive. These results resemble my earlier findings in the sense of revealing that inequality is 
bad for growth in poor countries and good for growth in rich countries. However, the break point 
is now at a higher value of per capita GDP. Thus, for most of the sample, the estimated effect of 
                                                 
3  See Barro (1991) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) Chapter 12.  
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inequality on growth is now in the negative range. This result accords with the significantly 
negative inequality coefficient shown in column 2, which omitted an interaction term with GDP. 
 
Figures 2 and 3 depict the results graphically. Figure 2, based on Table 4, column 2, shows the 
average partial effect of the Gini coefficient on growth. (The effect is partial in the sense of 
holding fixed the influences of the other explanatory variables contained in the system.) 
Consistent with the statistically significant negative coefficient, the relation is negative. However, 
it is also clear from Figure 2 that variations in income inequality do not account for a lot of the 
variations in growth rates. 
 
Figure 3 uses the results from Table 4, column 3 to show the partial relation between growth 
and the Gini coefficient for two ranges of per capita GDP. The left panel is for per capita GDP 
less than $11,900, the break point implied by the estimated coefficients. The negative relation 
between growth and inequality shows up in this range. The right panel applies for per capita 
GDP above $11,900. There are many fewer observations in the right panel compared to the left 
one (69 versus 185) because, as mentioned, the majority of the country-period observations fall 
in the interval where greater inequality is estimated to reduce growth. The pattern in the right 
panel also makes clear that there is little evidence for a range of positive effect of inequality on 
growth. Rather, the main indication is that the negative effect of inequality on growth does not 
apply for rich countries. 
 
De Gregorio and Lee (2004) argue that, in addition to direct effects, income inequality affects 
economic growth indirectly by influencing other determinants of growth. In particular, they find 
that more inequality tends to raise fertility and lower secondary school enrollment and the rule of 
law. Through these channels, greater income inequality would lower economic growth by more 
that the direct effect already discussed. I have investigated some of the indirect channels 
discussed by De Gregorio and Lee (2004). I find that income inequality (gauged by the Gini 
coefficient) has a positive effect on the log of the total fertility rate, but the coefficient is not 
statistically significant at conventional levels. Combining the point estimate of this coefficient 
with the estimated effect of the fertility variable on economic growth (Table 4, column 2) leads to 
an indirect effect of inequality on growth that is minor compared to the direct effect (-0.001, 
versus a direct effect of -0.036). 
 
I find that inequality has a significantly negative effect on male upper-level school attainment, 
the variable used in Table 4. However, male upper-level school attainment has a small and 
statistically insignificant effect on economic growth, once income inequality is held constant 
(Table 4, column 2). Hence, this indirect channel produces little. 
 
I found a negligible and statistically insignificant effect of income inequality on the rule of-law 
indicator, which enters as a growth determinant in Table 4. Therefore, the inclusion of a rule-of-
law channel adds little. 
 
I also considered the interplay between income inequality and health—a channel not considered 
by De Gregorio and Lee (2004). There is some indication that higher income inequality leads to 
lower life expectancy; that is, to a higher value of the reciprocal of life expectancy, the variable 
used in Table 4. However, the coefficient is not statistically significant at conventional levels. 
Combining the point estimate of this coefficient with the estimated effect of the life-expectancy 
variable on economic growth (Table 4, column 2) generates an indirect effect of inequality of 
growth that is minor compared to the direct effect (-0.002 versus -0.036). 
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The conclusion is that I get little overall effect from the various indirect channels considered. 
The main impact of income inequality on economic growth seems to be the direct effect shown 
in Table 2. 
 
 
V.   Concluding Observations 
 
International data show that the Kuznets curve is a clear empirical phenomenon. Income 
inequality first rises but subsequently declines with per capita GDP. The range of declining 
inequality covers the majority of country-time observations. The Kuznets curve is reasonably 
stable from the 1960s through the 2000s. However, this curve does not explain the bulk of the 
observed variation in income inequality across countries or over time. 
 
The direct effect of international openness on income inequality is positive. The coefficient that 
captures this effect is stable over time. With a fixed coefficient, the expansion of world trade 
since the 1960s translates into a larger influence on inequality in the 2000s, relative to earlier 
decades. However, the contribution is still modest, compared to the mean and standard 
deviation of observed income-inequality measures. 
 
Because trade stimulates economic growth, there is also an indirect effect of trade on inequality, 
involving rising levels of per capita GDP. This channel reduces income inequality over time in 
most countries. Moreover, the increases in per capita GDP mean that enhanced trade can lower 
poverty even if income inequality rises. 
 
A cross-country-growth framework reveals a negative effect from income inequality on 
economic growth, holding fixed a familiar set of other explanatory variables. This effect of 
inequality on growth diminishes as per capita GDP rises and may be positive for the richest 
countries. Other findings are familiar from previous empirical studies. In particular, there is 
conditional convergence in the sense that poor countries grow faster, holding fixed a set of 
explanatory variables. Growth is particularly encouraged by greater international openness, 





Table 1: Evolution of Inequality Measures, 1960s–2000s 
 
Variable  1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s
Gini Coefficient  0.43 0.41 0.39 0.41  0.39
Lowest quintile share  0.056 0.056 0.060 0.056  0.061
Highest quintile share  0.483 0.468 0.467 0.493  0.465
 
Notes: Data are from United Nations, World Income Inequality Data Base, and Deininger and Squire (1996). Averages give equal 







Table 2: Means and Standard Deviations of Variables 
 
































Dummy for net income or expenditure  0.37 0.44 0.68 0.77  0.67
Dummy for individual  0.37 0.38 0.72 0.91  0.83










Dummy for Sub- Saharan Africa  0.074 0.17 0.22 0.26  0.13
Dummy for Latin America 0.28 0.25 0.24 0.18  0.23
Dummy for former colony 0.67 0.68 0.69 0.66  0.51




















No. observations  54 77 90 120  92
 
*Numbers of observations for lowest quintile share for the various periods are 47, 65, 81, 117, and 81. Numbers for highest quintile 
share are 41, 57, 77, 115, and 81. 
 
Notes: Sample periods correspond to those from the regression system in Table 3, column 2. Each cell shows the mean, with the 
standard deviation in parentheses. Gini coefficients and quintiles shares (from United Nations, World Income Inequality Data Base,
and World Bank, Deininger and Squire Income Inequality Data Base) are observed near to the middle of each decade. Real per
capita GDP (in 2000 US dollars from Penn-World Tables) is at the start of each decade. Dummy for net income or expenditure
signifies that income inequality is computed from an income concept based on income net of taxes or on consumer expenditure,
rather than gross income. Dummy for individual means that the economic unit is an individual, rather than a household or family.
Openness ratio (from Penn-World Tables and World Bank, World Development Indicators or WDI) is the ratio of exports plus
imports to GDP. The openness variable filters the openness ratio for the estimated effects from the logs of country population and
area (data from WDI). (This filtering takes out an overall constant term but not the individual intercepts for each period.) The values












Table 3: Regression Results for Income Inequality (Kuznets curves) 
 
  Dependent Variable 









  (1) (2)    (3)  (4)  (5) 
log(per capita GDP)     0.266** 
(0.066) 
   0.292** 
(0.058) 


















Dummy net  
income/expend.  
  -0.0543** 
(0.0091) 








Dummy individual          -0.0188 
(0.0099) 
       -0.0173* 
(0.0087) 
       -0.0215* 
(0.0085) 
   0.0075** 
(0.0022) 
       -0.0095 
(0.0080) 
Dummy sub-  
Saharan Africa   --     0.092** 
(0.014)  --   -0.0217** 
(0.0034) 
   0.090** 
(0.013) 
Dummy Latin  
America   --     0.085** 
(0.013)  --   -0.0187** 
(0.0031) 
   0.066** 
(0.011) 










   0.0374** 
(0.0095) 
Openness  




       -0.0012 
(0.0026) 
        0.0154 
(0.0089) 
Number of  
observations  
54, 78, 91 
123, 94 
54, 77, 90 
120, 92 
54, 78, 91 
121, 93 
47, 65, 81 
117, 81 
41, 57, 77 
115, 81 
R-squared   .14, .18,.24 
.27, .47 
.35, .39, .59 
.57, .66  --  .17, .45, .50 
.53, .60 
.40, .45, .60 
.58, .71 
s.e. of regression  .092 .093 .096 
.098 .073 
.080 .081 .070 
.075 .059 
.054 .047 .044 
.070 .046 
.019 .016 .017 
.016 .015 
.065 .062 .054 
.066 .045 
 
*Significant at 5% level 
**Significant at 1% level 
 
Notes: See Table 2 for definitions and sources of variables. Dependent variables are Gini coefficients, lowest quintile income
shares, or highest quintile income shares, as indicated. Panel systems cover 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. Coefficients
were estimated by seemingly-unrelated-regression technique. Standard errors of coefficients are in parentheses. Each period has
an individual intercept (not shown). For the regression system in column 2, the estimated intercepts, expressed relative to that for
the 1960s, are -0.011 (s.e. = 0.012) for the 1970s, -0.018 (0.013) for the 1980s, 0.012 (0.014) for the 1990s, and 0.006 (0.014) for










Table 4: Regressions for Economic Growth 
 
Explanatory variable   (1)   (2)   (3)  




















































(Gini coefficient)* log(per capita GDP)   -- -- 0.0316**
(0.0118)



















*Significant at 5% level  
**Significant at 1% level  
 
The dependent variable is the annual growth rate of real per capita GDP (from Penn-World Tables). Panel systems cover 1965-75, 
1975-85, 1985-95, and 1995-2003/4. Coefficients were estimated by three-stage least-squares. Standard errors of coefficients are in 
parentheses. Each period has an individual intercept term (not shown). For the regression system in column 3, the estimated
intercepts, expressed relative to that for 1965-75, are -0.0137 (s.e. = 0.0029) for 1975-85, -0.0134 (0.0038) for 1985-95, and -
0.0164 (0.0044) for 1995-2003/4. A test that these three relative intercepts are jointly zero is rejected with a p-value of 0.000.  
 
Explanatory variables observed as averages for the ten-year periods are the openness variable (described in Table 2), an indicator
for the rule of law (from Political Risk Services), and the ratio of investment to GDP (from Penn-World Tables). Variables observed 
at the start of each ten-year period are the log of per capita GDP and the average years of school attainment of males at the
secondary and higher levels (from Barro and Lee [2001]). Variables observed for 1960, 1970, 1980, and 1990 are the reciprocal of
life expectancy at age one and the log of the total fertility rate (both from WDI). The terms-of-trade variable is the growth rate of the 
terms of trade (export prices relative to import prices, from International Monetary Fund) over the 10-year period, multiplied by the 
average over the same period of the openness ratio (exports plus imports as a ratio to GDP). For the first two periods, the rule-of-
law variable is the earliest value available (from the early 1980s). The Gini coefficient (in columns 2 and 3) applies, as in Table 3, 
roughly to 1965, 1975, 1985, and 1995. For the interaction term (column 3), the log of per capita GDP is for the same years. 
  
Instruments are five-year lagged values (applying to 1960, etc.) of the log of per capita GDP, the log of the total fertility rate, the rule-
of-law variable (when available), and the investment ratio. In the interaction term for the Gini coefficient, the log of per capita GDP is
for 1960, 1970, 1980, and 1990. For the other variables, the instruments coincide with the explanatory variables (applying to the 
start of each growth-rate period or to earlier times).  
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This  graph  corresponds  to  the  regression  system  in  Table  3,  column  2.  The  curve  shows  the  
partial relation between the Gini coefficient and the log of per capita GDP, holding fixed the estimated 


















































This graph corresponds to the regression system in Table 4, column 2. The curve 
shows the partial relation between the growth rate of per capita GDP and the Gini 
coefficient,  holding  fixed  the  estimated  effects  of  the  explanatory  variables  
other than the Gini coefficient. (The variable on the vertical axis has been 
normalized to have a mean of zero.)  
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Figure 3: Effects of Income Inequality on Economic Growth: Two Ranges 
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These graphs correspond to the regression system in Table 4, column 3. The curves show the partial relation 
between the growth rate of per capita GDP and the Gini coefficient, holding fixed the estimated effects of the 
explanatory variables other than the Gini coefficient and its interaction with the log of per capita GDP. (The 
variables on the vertical axis have been normalized to have means of zero.) The left-side graph is for per 
capita GDP less than $11,900 (185 observations). The right-side graph is for per capita GDP greater than 
$11,900 (69 observations). The break point of $11,900 (in 2000 US dollars) corresponds to the shift from a 
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